Copyright © 2007 G A
This document is licensed under the BSD license at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/BSD/
| Revision History | ||
|---|---|---|
| Revision 2.3.5.7.11.13.17 | 2007-12-23 | gea |
added a question about possible installation problems | ||
| Revision 2.3.5.7.11.13 | 2007-12-02 | gea |
addedd excellent faq about using tanks | ||
| Revision 2.3.5.7.11 | 2007-11-25 | gea |
Info added about this FAQ and updated information on the TacOps mailing list | ||
| Revision 2.3.5.7 | 2007-11-25 | |
Marjor reorganzation done by Bernard Cousin. | ||
| Revision 2.3.5 | 2007-11-21 | |
Ok. Initial FAQ Done. Lots of minor clean up and waiting for comments at this point will be the next step | ||
| Revision 2.3 | 2007-11-20 | |
Keeping track of changes. Currently, it is good enough form to help some people so I'm putting a version number | ||
| Revision 2 | 2007-11-17 | |
Gazette PDF converted into txt files. | ||
Abstract
This is a Faq for TacOps.
Please keep this faq update by sending any and all comments to <dude.mung@gmail.com> Please let me if you are interested in mainting this FAQ.
The most updated version of this FAQ will be at http://mung.net/howto/TacOps.html.
The XML source file will be sent as requested to allow anyone intersted in editing this FAQ
Table of Contents
READ THE USER's GUIDE that MAJOR H has provided with the game. Read the whole thing, twice. I can not stress this enough.
| 1. | Does TacOps have a Mailing list? If so what is the name? If not how do I find out the latest about Tacops? |
The TacOps mailing is http://nxport.com/mailman/listinfo/. It is the best place to get your answers that this faq doesn't contain. The other site is for up to date infomration is the Battlefront webpage where you can buy TacOps. |
| 1. | could you give a small list of each weapon? For instance, "LAV 25: A light armored recon vehicle, used to outflank the enemy on the sides....." |
Will be in the TacOps Battle Book [1] when it is published this summer. Production costs and falling street price for wargames kept us from including detailed material like this in the printed user guide that comes with the game. Lots of people ask for such detailed info but most are unwilling to pay for it *g*. |
| 1. | I recall there was a way to sequentially select units in TacOps (by pushing a key). Do I remember right and if I do, which one is it? |
There is no such feature in TacOps.[1] |
| 1. | If I have a counter with 4 tanks, that counter makes one spotting check for all four tanks, correct? |
Yes and no. There is a gross spotting check that only happens once per friendly marker per 15 second pulse. This check has no random factors so there is no reason to repeat it for each strength point in the marker. If the gross spotting check reveals an enemy unit then there is a targeting or acquisition check that is done by each strength point in the marker. | |
| 2. | And if one tank fires at a target, that counts towards raising the chance of a hit for the remaining 3 tanks in the counter, correct? |
Yes but not until the next 15 second pulse. | |
| 3. | ... regarding spotting ... are vehicles more/less visible when on different terrain types, or are only terrain features taken into account here? |
The rougher the terrain the less visible are all units (more relevant before they start moving or firing, less relevant after) - also harder to spot, and harder to hit by direct fire. Woods or town adds an additional reduction to that provided by any present roughness level. | |
| 4. | In the limited number of scenarios I've played, I've noticed that troops at level one tend to treat ground at level zero as 'out of view'. Is this the sim, or just my inexperience? If not it tends to give the lie to 'Take the High Ground'! |
The outermost 100 meters of high ground, woods, and town terrain (ten pixels plus or minus a pixel or two) provide a dual spotting zone. In the case of high ground it relates to the ability to see from the high ground down to low ground. In the case of woods and town terrain it relates to seeing out. From the first or outermost 100 meters above the contour line a unit can see both all otherwise unblocked high ground and all otherwise unblocked low ground. If the unit backs away from this 100 meter buffer, then it will only be able to see units that are on high ground. If it crosses the contour - headed downhill - then it will only be able to see units that are either on low ground or that are themselves right next to a high ground contour. In the outermost 100 meters of woods and town terrain you can see and shoot out of the woods and town but your visibility to the enemy is greatly reduced (until you fire). For visualizing LOS, you need to key on the center point of the unit marker. If you are "in the zone" and if you are using one of the larger marker sets, a lot of the unit marker will appear to actually be out of the woods. Again, it is where the center point of the marker is that is important for LOS. | |
| 5. | One problem (bug perhaps Major?) is that if an OPFOR unit doesn't actually have smoke ON it, it will shoot at the helo's even if they don't really have an LOS. For example, I dropped smoke all across the "southern" side of the base and left the northern end open. Although the ZU's and SA-16 units had no LOS to the south, they still managed to take out my entire landing force. Be warned! |
Not a bug. (1) From point A to point B, LOS between a ground unit and a helicopter can be different from what it would be from a ground unit to a ground unit - depends on the altitude of the helicopter. The LOS tool only shows ground to ground LOS unless you pin it as originating from a helo unit. (2) Some weapons have thermal sights (ie. the SA-16 SAM) which see through smoke. | |
| 6. | I don't understand how to pin the LOS check to a unit. When you click on a unit to select it, the Unit Orders Window is displayed and the Map Menu containing the LOS check is "grayed out" making it inaccessible. What am I doing wrong? |
To "pin" the line of sight tool to a specific unit you must select the unit in a way that does not trigger the opening of its unit orders window. You can do this two ways. Hold down the shift key as you click on a unit marker - this will "highlight" the unit marker without opening its orders window. Now select the LOS tool menu item. Or ... Click on empty map some distance away from the marker, hold down the left mouse button, and "drag out" a selection rectangle that includes the unit - this will "highlight" the unit marker rather than open its orders window. Now select the LOS tool menu item. | |
| 7. | About LOS, how far can units see out of woods? I've had units that are right on the edge of a wood and yet they could still not see out of it and when I used the LOS tool, it showed a blocked LOS from the unit to the area outside of the woods. |
The outermost 100 meters of woods and town terrain (ten pixels plus or minus a pixel or two) provide the dual spotting zone - i.e. you can see and shoot out of the woods and town but your visibility to the enemy is greatly reduced (until you fire). For visualizing LOS, you need to key on the center point of the unit marker. If you are "in the zone" and if you are using one of the larger marker sets, a lot of the unit marker will appear to actually be out of the woods. A similar effect occurs in the outermost 100 meters of high ground terrain. In the first 100 meters above the contour line a unit can see both all otherwise unblocked high ground and all otherwise unblocked low ground. If the unit backs away from this 100 meter buffer, then it will only be able to see units that are on high ground. If it crosses the contour - headed downhill then it will only be able to see units that are either on low ground or that are themselves right next to a high ground contour. Again, it is where the center point of the marker is that is important for LOS. After a few games you will get used to the dual zones and you will find that you don't need to use the LOS tool so much to confirm things. | |
| 8. | LOS and Aircraft? |
Rule: A clear LOS from any anti air weapon is assumed to exist to a fixed wing airstrike or to a helicopter at medium altitude unless there is woods or town terrain or a smoke cloud within 125 meters of the SAM and that terrain or smoke cloud is directly between the SAM and the fixed wing or helo target. | |
| 9. | I placed a ZSU-23 on a terrain object {building} and I later fired at it from a NOE position behind a group of trees. The LOS checker found it to be out of LOS as did the Thermal LOS check. |
Not a bug. The helo that was doing the shooting was positioned over a cell of town terrain with the town terrain being at elevation 0. The helo was at NOE but NOE when over woods and town is one elevation level higher than that terrain. For LOS purposes the helo was actually at elevation 1. When you use the LOS tool in the normal fashion it doesn't know that you are clicking on a helo. It assumes that you are checking ground level to ground level. Therefore you got a result of blocked line of sight. Try selecting the helo unit before triggering the LOS check. This will pin the LOS check to the helo and you will get a true reading. | |
| 10. | On a related note, it would be nice if a single click on a unit concurrent with a depressed "L" key would initiate a LOS check for a particular unit. I have gotten burned by missing a unit's center pixel, and then wrongly believing that that unit could cover a part of my operation. I know that I should be more careful, but when dealing with so many unit markers over a period of 120 scale minutes such a feature would be neat. |
Hold down the shift key with your left hand, click on a unit with your right hand - the unit will be selected/highlighted - release the shift key, release the mouse button and do a Command L you will get a LOS cross hair that is pinned as originating from the exact center point of the selected unit. | |
| 11. | Highlight all places on the map that are visible from that unit. |
The last time I tried to code this, the number crunching involved slowed the function so much on most Macs that I didn't feel anyone would use the feature more than once *grin*.[2] |
This issue focuses on the TacOps map making utility.
Hmmm ... I seem to have left the portable and transportable bombs out of the user guide.
Portable and transportable bombs can be added to a scenario by use of the "Options/Add One" unit menu item. The power of the bomb is defined by the user (normally an umpire) when it is created. A portable bomb can be carried by dismounted personnel and by vehicles. A transportable bomb can only be carried by a vehicle. Bombs are activated by the owning player opening an orders window for the bomb and setting a detonation time. If an umpire opens an orders window for a bomb, the umpire may also specify or change the casualty radius of the bomb.
Bombs have the following attributes ...
A. Bombs do not spot. An exposed bomb marker will be revealed if/while any enemy unit is within 50 meters. A bomb that is being carried by a person or in a vehicle will not be revealed while it is being carried.
B. On map units will not engage enemy bomb markers with direct fire. Bombs may be coincidentally disabled or destroyed by indirect fire. An umpire can remove a bomb by using the "Options/Delete Units" menu item or the "Options/Kill Units" menu item. A US EOD/UXO Team or a Civilian EOD/UXO Team can disarm portable and transportable bombs. The unit is ordered to attempt to disarm a bomb by using a button in its unit orders window. There is a slight chance that an EOD unit disarm attempt will detonate the bomb. Disarming will take from five to ten minutes and the player will not know the exact time that will be required.
C. The power of a bomb marker is defined by its casualty radius. The casualty radius is defined at the instant of the bomb.s addition to the game. An umpire may also change the casualty radius of a bomb at any time. A bomb should not be given a casualty radius larger than 100 to 200 meters unless it is equivalent to a nuclear device. The special bomb markers are not really intended to represent nuclear devices but the following casualty radii are suggested if the user wants a gross approximation of the blast effects of a nuclear device: .5 kiloton - 600 meters, 1 kiloton -700 meters, 2 kiloton - 900 meters, 5 kiloton - 1000 meters, 10 kiloton - 1100 meters. Note that crater effect, blow down, fire, and radiation will not be represented when the bomb detonates.
D. Armored vehicles located within the first 12.5% of a bomb.s casualty radius will be automatically destroyed. The risk to armored vehicles then declines linearly to zero at 50% of the bomb.s casualty radius.
E. Dismounted personnel in entrenchments within the first 12.5% of a bomb.s casualty radius will be automatically destroyed. The risk to dismounted personnel in entrenchments then declines linearly to zero at 50% of the bomb.s casualty radius.
F. Unarmored vehicles located within the first 25% of a bomb.s casualty radius will be automatically destroyed. The risk to unarmored vehicles then declines linearly to zero at the bomb maximum casualty radius.
G. Dismounted exposed personnel within the first 50% of a bomb.s casualty radius will be automatically destroyed. The risk to exposed dismounted personnel then declines linearly to zero at the bomb.s maximum casualty radius.
H. All surviving units located anywhere within the bomb.s casualty radius will be suppressed.
I. Any bridge has a 95% chance of destruction if a portable bomb or a transportable bomb is detonated on the bridge. The center point of the bomb marker must be located inside the bridge marker.
By Don Hill and Major Holdridge
This article summarizes a few key tactical principles for modern combat that translate well into better TacOps game play. Due to space limitations, only the most important defensive measures are discussed.
Stay focused on your mission and your enemy's mission. In TacOps, scenario victory conditions are always stated as missions. Any action that does not support mission accomplishment will usually support mission failure. There is usually more to a TacOps scenario than just charging directly toward the nearest enemy unit and slugging it out. Do not get drawn into firefights that do not contribute to mission accomplishment.
Analyze the terrain. Identify high speed avenues of approach - corridors where clear terrain or roads allow rapid movement to enemy units. Always cover these with observation and long range direct fire weapons and be prepared to move rapidly to block them with additional forces. Critical high speed avenues may need to be physically blocked by dismounted rifle units. Identify areas of rough terrain and try to channel the enemy into them by covering the easier routes with high accuracy long range weapons and or mines. An enemy armored unit moving slowly in rough terrain makes an easy target for artillery and air support. Rough terrain can often be initially defended just with observation posts, but be prepared to move in real fighting units as it becomes necessary. Compare the terrain against the enemy mission. You will often find that the enemy does not have the time or resources to use certain avenues of approach.
Analyze the general strengths and weaknesses of your units and those of your enemy. For example, if you are a Marine commander, you should recognize that Marine units have large footprints with more riflemen per unit and a good short to midrange anti-armor capability, but that they are often not very tactically mobile and are often weak in long range anti-armor weapons. Your worst problem may occur when OPFOR concentrates on one part of your defense since the rest of your force may not have the mobility to rapidly reinforce. If you are commanding an Army mechanized unit, you should recognize that you have very good mobility and a very good mid to long range anti-armor capability but that you may be weak in rifle level staying power. In this case, OPFOR's best threat may be to utilize multiple simultaneous avenues of approach either hoping to find a gap, or intending for one axis to be the main effort while the others pin or mislead you.
Analyze the strengths and weaknesses of specific weapons, especially those on vehicles that frequently face each other. For example, the U.S. Bradley has a TOW Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) that can kill armor out to 3750 meters. The OPFOR BMP has the AT5 ATGM which is slower than the TOW, but it hits at 4000 meters and beyond. If the BMP can engage the Bradley at ranges greater than 3750 meters it can kill the Bradley without risk of return fire. On the other hand, if the BMP engages the Bradley from 3000 to 3750 meters, the Bradley may have time to spot the BMP and fire the faster TOW, killing the BMP before its missile reaches the Bradley. Look for team solutions to tactical problems. The enhanced ammo of the OPFOR T-80 tank can not penetrate the front of an M-1 tank at more than 3000 meters. BMPs cannot kill the M1 tank from the front or side except with very slow to reload enhanced ATGMs. If the Bradley is teamed with the M1, the Bradley can kill the T-80 tanks before they close to within 3000 meters, the Bradleys can then pull back a bit and they and the M1 tanks can wreak havoc on the BMPs. Look for the peculiarities and advantages.
Gain and maintain contact and prevent battlefield isolation. The attacker has the initiative and will often attempt to isolate the battlefield by maneuver by concentrating his main force against only one sector of the defense. The focal point of the attack becomes isolated from reinforcement when more distant defensive units are unable to maneuver towards the point of decision either through faulty intelligence (fog of war ) or due to being pinned by minor enemy supporting attacks. Early and constant observation of the enemy forces are the keys to avoiding isolation. The defender must be able to observe the attacking forces early enough to both attrit them at long range and to assess their intended focal point so that the defense may be reinforced at that point. To do this the defender must not confine himself to the initial deployment limitations of the set up. Scouts and observation posts (OPs) should be pushed forward to cover all mission significant enemy avenues of approach. OPs should be redundant and they should be positioned to provide overlapping coverage of critical areas so that the loss of one OP to enemy action or its being masked by smoke or terrain does not create a large blind spot. OPs should generally not fire and reveal their position unless they are about to be overrun. Some defensive OPs should allow themselves to be bypassed so that they may continue to provide intelligence and to control long range artillery fires from behind the attackers.
Once the attacking forces are discovered, they usually should be engaged immediately. Generally it its best to first engage distant attackers with artillery and air support rather than direct fire to avoid prematurely revealing the trace of the positions of your short to medium range weapons. This is especially true if the attacker is deployed with much of his strength forward. Artillery can destroy anything on the battlefield, particularly with ICM, but artillery must have forward observers for maximum effect. The proper use of forward observers and artillery will go far in disrupting an enemy attack. If the enemy is leading with a small reconnaissance force, it may be more appropriate to engage the scouts with a few high accuracy, long range direct fire weapons so that you can immediately blind him and to prevent the reconnaissance elements from exposing your main positions. Try to take out such small advance forces with only a few concentrated volleys and then move any of your units that have fired to nearby alternate positions to await the main body. This is best done with forward deployed units, skirmishers, if you will, that briefly engage the lead enemy units and then retire using terrain and smoke to cover their withdrawal. This screening force must avoid becoming decisively engaged by the main enemy force.
The defender also has a means to isolate portions of the battlefield. The key to the concept is to concentrate units and to position them in a manner that allows them to momentarily engage a smaller piece of the enemy force. For example, as OPFOR units advance to contact, they will often be strung out in a column of variable density and length. The defender can place himself at an angle to or on the flank of this advance, using elevation differences, towns, and or woods to initially screen himself from direct observation by the attacking units. As enemy units begin to pass through the screening terrain, the leading elements will become exposed. Since trailing enemy units will not yet be able to see the defenders, the defenders will be able to destroy the more forward attackers piecemeal without being subjected to return fire by the entire enemy force. If enemy reaction is sluggish and he continues to feed his troops into the kill zone after the initial ambush, this tactic can be continued from the same or nearby alternate firing positions. If the enemy reacts well and begins to deploy against your flanks, then immediately move to positions that will provide a similar terrain advantage against his flanking maneuver. This technique is known as terrain masking by angle.
The same tactic can be based on terrain masking by elevation. In this case, the opposing forces are on significantly different ground elevations. The opponents cannot see each other until the leading attacking units crest a hill. The defending force can then engage and destroy just the leading units, again without being exposed to return fire from the entire enemy force.
There are variations, such as using smoke to separate the leading attacking units from following units, but the concept remains the same.
Whenever possible the defense should be conducted as a mobile defense that withdraws through a series of temporary fighting positions to a final point of decision. Until the attacker is heavily attrited, the defender should avoid decisive engagement. The initial formula should generally be: observe, engage with artillery, engage briefly with long range direct fire weapons and withdraw those weapons, engage briefly with mid range weapons and withdraw those weapons. Repeat this until either the enemy has been reduced to a manageable size or there is nowhere left to withdraw to - this is the point of decision. Assuming surprise fire is still possible, the defender's first goal at this last position is to kill as many targets as possible in the first few volleys of direct fire. After that the only choice remaining is usually to maintain fire, maintain position, and ride out the attack.
By Don Hill and Major Holdridge.
Mission accomplishment is the standard by which success or failure is judged. Focus your plan of attack primarily on the mission and secondarily on the enemy. Individual enemy units are only relevant to the degree that they can interfere with the accomplishment of your mission. Do not become so caught up in fighting that you forget your mission.
Once you understand the mission, the next step is to analyze friendly and enemy forces and their capabilities. If you are commanding OPFOR and your force is composed of T80s and BTRs, the T80s will be about the only effective weapon you have for engaging enemy vehicles at long range. In this case, you cannot afford to pause and slug it out with a mechanized defender. You must rely on speed, artillery support, and the mass of numbers to close with and overwhelm the enemy. If your force is composed of T80s and BMPs you will be able to engage in a more deliberate attack , perhaps even a multi stage approach, since your BMPs can engage enemy APCs and IFVs at long range, and can even kill the M1 tank if enhanced ATGMs are being used.
As the US commander you should note that the M1 can kill anything on the battlefield from any aspect at great range, and that it has superior armor to the OPFOR tanks. Without improved ATGMs, only the T80 can kill the M1 from the front or sides. This usually makes the M1 the best choice to lead any advance. If your force consists of M1s and Bradley IFVs the Bradleys should usually trail the M1s by 500 to 1000 meters. If your force consists of LAVs and M1s, the M1s should usually still lead but you will have to approach the enemy more carefully, taking maximum advantage of terrain masking. Only the M1s and a few LAV TOW vehicles will be able to kill T80 tanks and just about anything can kill an ordinary LAV25. The same applies with a force of AAV7s and M1s, but you must be even more careful in your attack. The AAV7s simply carry too many Infantrymen to be rashly exposed to enemy fire. If there is enough time, dismount the Javelins in the AAV7s to overwatch the advance, but never lead with these huge APCs.
When analyzing the enemy force you must consider his ability to maneuver and his fire capabilities. If the enemy force consists almost entirely of unmechanized infantry, then he will not be able to reinforce the point of attack rapidly. In this case, you may want to focus your attack on a rapid assault of one small area of the battlefield. Attacking unmechanized infantry on a wide frontage will usually only work to your disadvantage as it exposes you to a greater number of short range infantry weapons. If the defender is mobile, attack at multiple points but focus on one as the main effort and threaten the others with supporting or diversionary efforts. Supporting attacks will tend to keep the defender from being able to shift his troop line and from being able to concentrate artillery and air support at the point of decision . Be alert to exploit unexpected success on the part of a supporting attack. A supporting attack may find a gap in the defense or the enemy may recognize the main effort early on and choose to ignore the supporting attacks. In such a case it is possible that a supporting attack will encounter so little opposition that it should immediately assume the role of the main effort.
Analysis of the enemy fire capability is important for choosing target selection. If the enemy forces consist of BTRs or BMPs without improved ATGMs, then only the T80 will be able to kill the M1. In this case, the T80 should be the US's priority target. Once all are eliminated, the M1 will be able to dominate the long and mid range battlefield. When fighting Marine forces, TOWs and M1s should be the priority targets due to their maneuverability, and long range lethality. All exposed infantry and ATGM teams are highly susceptible to casualties and suppression from artillery fire. Just a suppression result will greatly reduce infantry's movement speed, rate of fire, and accuracy. ATGM teams should always be a special priority for artillery.
When analyzing the terrain for offensive operations you should first consider the time available to accomplish your mission. Next identify all reasonable attack routes or avenues of approach that will meet your mission time limit. Mentally identify likely enemy unit defensive positions along each route and select the route that offers the best potential for coping with them. The obvious advantage of a high speed avenue of approach, such as a road or open terrain, is that it takes the attacker less time to close with the defender and thus the defender has less time to adjust artillery and to engage in direct fire. Fewer shots by the defender translates directly into fewer kills. Being able to speed through incoming artillery is especially advantages to the attacker. The primary considerations in deciding whether to attack using a high speed avenue of approach is the expected density of enemy long range weapons defending that route and how much of the route they command. High defender density combined with long range line of sight usually means disaster for a high speed attack. In such a case, you should look for a more covered route, take the time for an extended artillery bombardment, and in general make a more deliberate attack. However, if you have very little time allowed for your mission, then you must use the most direct attack route, regardless of consequences. In such a case, using your supporting artillery for widely roving general suppression may prove more beneficial than concentrating it for killing effect.
Using a low speed avenue of approach through rough terrain, woods, or a town also has its advantages. They generally offer long range concealment from enemy observation and best case, some units may avoid detection altogether. Even if you are spotted, such terrain often reduces the enemy's direct fire hit probability significantly. It is also likely that these approaches are less heavily defended than the high speed avenues. The disadvantages are that once attackers are spotted in rough terrain, their slower movement makes them easier to hit with artillery and allows the defender more time for direct fire. Also, the slower rate of advance will give the defender more time to shift reinforcements to directly face or flank your attack.
Both the attacker and defender struggle to control the pace and events of the battlefield. One way to achieve control is to isolate a portion of battlefield so that only a portion of the enemy's forces are able to participate in an engagement thus enabling you to overwhelm them with firepower. One way the attacker can isolate the battlefield is by maneuver. If the defending force consists mostly of unmechanized Infantry, then the attacker can use either surprise or superior mobility to focus his forces at one point faster than the enemy can reinforce .
Another way the attacker can isolate the battlefield is by using the terrain to restrict observation and exposure to direct fire. Attacking formations can take advantage of terrain elevation masking to advance in tighter formations while out of the line of sight of known enemy positions with a pause just before an elevation change to deploy into a more on line attack formation. As discussed in a previous article, terrain masking by elevation can work to the defender's advantage by suddenly exposing the attacking forces piecemeal to defending units at a different elevation. The attacker can reduce the effects of this by crossing elevation changes with his units more on line. When the attacker crosses elevation changes in this manner he is more likely to achieve fire superiority in an isolated enemy kill zone and to avoid piecemeal attrition.
As extended formations pass around woods or hills, leading elements may become exposed to fire while trailing units are still out of sight. For a moment, trailing units cannot support the leaders since their line of sight is still blocked by the nearby terrain feature. This is terrain masking by angle. The attacker can take similar advantage from terrain masking by angle as was discussed for masking by elevation. Crossing such terrain in mass or on line is just as helpful in reducing the effectiveness of masking by angle as it is against masking by elevation. If the attacker has enough time he can reduce the threat of terrain masking by moving through or over terrain that blocks line of sight in mass or on line. If the terrain feature is woods or town, the leading units should pause at the edge of the terrain feature and provide overwatch as trailing units move up to and perhaps pass through their position. Not only will the attacker have more forces to return fire, the units providing overwatch will be stationary and in cover thus increasing their chances to spot and hit and giving them added protection from fire.
Someone recently asked me for a PBEM critique of a TF Savage game. The message that follows is that info restated without the personal notes *g*.
Critical Item One: In the defense, you must maintain contact if you are to be able to track the enemy. You want to track the enemy so that you can predict his attack routes and then react to them by repositioning your defense. Contact does not necessarily mean shooting - you can maintain contact just through observation. You must have an adequate security and observation screen. When on the defense you need to put out as many observation posts (OPs) as you can spare. You also need to overlap the OP's coverage so that when one gets eliminated or smoked there is another nearby which can still see what is going on. You should strive to always know within a kilometer where the major enemy elements are. When you know where the enemy is and or his route of advance then you can move units to intercept him. Just as important is knowing where the enemy is not. If through good battlefield observation, you know that the enemy is not in a given area in force, then you can pull friendlies out of that area to reinforce the developing point or points of decision.
Critical Item Two: Maintain worthwhile mobile reserves. Often you need two different kinds of mobile reserves. You should have one at least one reserve force consisting of medium and long range anti armor weapons for distant ambush/armor plinking. The other reserve force should consist of infantry with light anti armor weapons to be used to physically block a critical avenue of approach or to backstop a unit that is about to be overrun. As soon as you commit a reserve force try to build another to take its place - look for folks in non threatened areas to move to some central location to become the new reserve.
| 1. | This brings to mind a point I've meant to inquire on. I'm often tempted to leave behind "sacrificial" observation or ambush teams, with no realistic chance for their survival or extraction. Is that practice at all consistent with Western (or, for that matter, OPFOR) doctrine? |
Inserting observation posts into enemy held areas has been a standard tactic - especially in counter insurgency ops. However I think intentionally leaving a team behind to be bypassed by advancing enemy units would be an unusual tactic for a modern US commander. On the other hand, I remember knowing as a Marine infantry Lt that 'observe and report' was a standing order for cut off or bypassed units. Also, several times in field training I was told to leave a fireteam behind as a hidden observation post to adjust arty and air support while the rest of the company displaced to a new position - the team was expected to later escape and evade to a pickup point. Things like this don't seem particularly unreasonable to me for light infantry ops (i.e. everybody is on foot). I suspect the pucker factor would go way up if somebody told me to try it with a Bradley or a HMMWV. A brief search of my Military Reference Library CD produced one US doctrinal note on this. FM 7-93 Long-Range Surveillance Unit Operations, page 3-15 says ... 'Stay-Behind Technique. The [recon] team purposely allows itself to be passed by the enemy to perform a specific mission.' In the 80s I attended several NATO defense plan briefings which included predesignated 'stay behind' teams in the friendly order of battle. These teams were not comprised of US troops. | |
| 2. | This group was a sitting duck, because I didn't want to move them out of their defensive position. I would like to make my defense less static and more spread out so that he cannot shell massed troops, but I want my troops to be in good defensive positions. |
Holding ground is often not important. Killing OPFOR is what counts. When you first start receiving arty it is time to go somewhere else fast - you have to get out of there before his arty fire gets accurate. | |
| 3. | This is important, I think. There's absolutely no reason (at least not in general), to start releasing at the first possible moment. Sure, due to one being in covering terrain and being unspotted, one will probably kill more units than one loses - but this advantage won't disappear as a result of waiting. What _is_ important is to see the enemy for as much of the time as possible. |
It is different now, but for much of my time in the Marine Corps, published doctrine was to employ a defense that engaged the attacker as soon as possible with whatever weapon could reach him at the instant. Most direct fire weapons were located more or less on line. The idea was that this would cause the attacker to travel through an ever increasing volume of fire. First he would be engaged by air attack, then by arty, then by TOWs, then by tank gun, then by mortar, then by heavy machine gun, then by medium machine gun, then by Dragon, and finally by rifle fire and LAAW. Each weapon system would join in the firing as soon as the attacker advanced into that weapon's max effective range. Such a defense might be useful against repelling a WWII banzai attack or a Korean War human wave attack, but I think TacOps accurately shows such a defense to be terribly flawed in a situation where the attacker has good comms and responsive arty and where the attacker precedes his main force with a thin line of recon/skirmishers. In the latter situation, the piecemeal firing of long range direct fire weapons at their max effective range just gives the attacker an early opportunity to take them out with arty. In my opinion the optimum defense would be one that engages the attacker only with arty, mortar, and air for as long as possible so as not to reveal the trace of the direct fire defense positions. Direct fire should be withheld until it can be delivered simultaneously by as many weapons as possible in a devastating opening volley. What happens next depends on the terrain and situation but I am convinced that in general - whether a defender wins or loses the direct fire fight that follows this initial concentrated volley - he should move the bulk of his forces to new defensive positions as soon as possible to avoid the arty barrage that is sure to follow. | |
| 4. | When playing TacOps, I often do much the same thing with my observation posts. My OPs will stand until overrun, but the information they provide is invaluable when considering it helps to prevent an even greater loss. Yet, I would sure hate to be the poor slobs being overrun. |
If it is any comfort, you don't have to consider the overrun infantry units in TacOps as always being "dead or captured". It is plausible that they went into hiding or escaped but that the nature of their situation became such that they were not combat effective or able to contact higher headquarters again for the time remaining in the scenario. Were I too add a campaign mode of play to TacOps, I would likely usually restore a very large percentage of the unit losses (especially foot infantry) in one scenario for the begining of the next scenario. These would not be new guys or replacements - they would be troops and equipment that had returned to a state of combat effectiveness or that had regained command and control. | |
| 5. | It seems sometimes I have command of a sharpshooting high kill ratio formation, other times a command that can`t hit anything let alone kill it ? |
Fortunes of war - however some general rules of thumb - units that shoot first from good, covered, unspotted positions will be rewarded - units that get surprised in weak positions will be punished - units that fire too long from the same position will tend to get punished. Also, if some of your units get royally nailed in a fire fight or experience several consecutive minutes of effective arty attack you need to try to pull them out of harms way for a few minutes. A lot of folks don't pay much attention to all those "S" (suppression) results produced by effective arty fire - that is a mistake *g*. | |
| 6. | A general problem seen is that there is no reason to have units in reserve, at a tactical level. For instance, one person may want to deploy his tanks in a V formation. He wants four tanks to the left, four to the right and the last four in the middle but back about 200 meters. In the game all this means is the front tanks will be defeated/eliminated and then the back tanks will come up and be eliminated. We game players know that you put all tanks up so that the survivors can fire back at the bad guys and survive the second combat pulse. |
I almost always see a need for a reserve except usually not at platoon level and sometimes not at company level. Depends on the terrain and the situation. The same thing would happen in real life if the leading tanks could be seen and shot at and if the following tanks could not yet see who was shooting at (i.e. killing) the leading tanks. In rough terrain, a loose V formation can be the same thing as committing your tanks piecemeal. You are just parading into the kill zone. | |
| 7. | I have'nt figuered out how to move my units forward without becoming ambush meat. Further, it seems that even in a full frontal assault, my units don't seem to fire often or soon after the enemy has begun firing. Any suggestions about offensive strategy would be welcome. |
You might want to pick up the next issue of Strategy Plus magazine. [4] The current issue (January) has an article on TacOps defensive strategy and the next issue (February) will have an article on offensive strategy. In a nutshell ... in the offense you want to cross elevation changes and blocking terrain in mass so that you don't get in a situation where your guys in the rear can't support the guys in front. When you hit an ambush you want everyone up front to return fire. Walk artillery missions ahead of your advance - target likely ambush sites before you start getting fire. Artillery even when it does not kill, reduces the accuracy and rate of fire of enemy units in its impact zone. If at all possible don't do frontal assaults. Back out of the kill zone and try flanking the enemy. You get big advantages from firing at the sides and rear of defending units, even those in entrenchments. Bottom line though is when you are in the offense you are gonna take some lumps. That is why you usually have a 2 or 3 to 1 advantage in force in the offensive scenarios. |
If you lose a platoon of armor to concentrated enemy fire at less than a thousand meters, don't send another platoon into the very same position five minutes later *g*. When you are on the defense, you should generally try to avoid advancing toward the enemy as much as possible- move laterally and to the rear, but avoid poking directly toward the enemy. You know where the enemy must go to accomplish the mission - position yourself to cover the ground that he must cross and wait for them to come to you.
Avoid massing Javelin ATGM teams in one marker and don't position them in exposed areas and away from transport. If an ATGM has a large field of view then so does the enemy. In such situations the ATGMs may toast a couple of vehicles but they will then be inundated with return fire and enemy arty. With no transport and with no covered avenue of escape nearby they can not fire a quick volley and then scoot to another position.
Machine guns are anti armor weapons if you are fighting BTRs and if you can get flanking and rear shots. Spread them out and position them with your SMAW teams. Let the enemy BTRs get within 500 meters and you can burn up a lot of them.
Don't automatically position troops right on the edge of your mission objective at game startup especially not ATGM teams - it is often a waste of weapons. You want to heavily attrit the enemy as far away from the objective as possible. By the time OPFOR gets in sight of the objective it is often too late if he has a good number of wheels and tracks left. Static objective defense forces are often better used with trucks and APCs as a mobile reserve. If towards the end of the game it becomes obvious that OPFOR is going to be able to roll within sight of the objective then at the last possible moment you break contact wherever you can and you retreat some units into final defensive positions on the perimeter of the objective.
Spread out your infantry more if they are meant to physically block an avenue of approach to the objective or to be used in a point blank range anti armor ambush. In defensive situations, split the rifle platoons into squads and spread them out shoulder to shoulder. If possible put a second much weaker and thinner line just behind the first. If you do this you won't find whole platoons being taken out of the fight at a critical moment by enemy smoke.